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Abstract  
We analyze a uniquely constructed data set of open market share repurchases across a 
sample of European firms. We find that the announcement date market reaction is 
lower than that in the US, mainly because of (i) the relatively large number of 
recurring announcements which generate significantly lower returns than the initial 
announcements of intention to repurchase shares; (ii) the rather low market reaction in 
France, due probably to specific governance and corporate cultural issues; and (iii) the 
regulatory reform that allowed UK firms to keep the repurchased shares as treasury 
stock, which decreased their market impact. Across our countries, taxation, 
shareholder protection, and the European Union's Market Abuse Directive do not 
affect significantly the market valuation of repurchases. Our results imply that, 
ultimately, domestic institutional specificities and reforms play significant roles in the 
market valuation and popularity of share repurchases. 
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1. Introduction 
Previous studies document a positive stock price reaction to the announcement of 
intention to repurchase shares. This reaction is related to various hypotheses, 
including the signaling of undervaluation, agency theory, capital restructuring, 
dividend substitution, management compensation incentives and firms¶ reputation. 
However, the empirical evidence provided to date on the impact of each of these 
factors is mixed, and although the information asymmetry/signaling hypothesis has 
long been viewed as a popular explanation, it does not necessarily hold in the context 
of open market and privately negotiated repurchases (Huang and Thakor, 2013). This 
is partly because most studies focus on a single country, where share repurchases have 
the same treatment, even though some regulatory changes may occur through time. 
(See Section 2 below, Vermaelen (2005) and Farre-Mensa et al. (2014) for reviews of 
the literature).  
In this paper we focus on the market valuation of share repurchases and its 
determinants across major European countries. We construct a unique hand-collected 
dataset of 970 announcements of intention to repurchase shares in the open market in 
France, Germany and the UK. We assess the effects of diversity across our countries 
in terms of regulatory and corporate governance settings (La Porta et al., 2000, 2002; 
Morck et al., 2005), the respective domestic reforms within each country, and the 
impact of recurring announcements on the market valuation of share repurchases.  
In line with previous evidence, we find a positive market reaction of 1.55%. 
These excess returns are relatively lower than the 3.54% reported in the US by, for 
example, Ikenberry et al. (1995). We first test whether this is due to differences in 
corporate governance across our countries. We expect the announcement date excess 
returns in the UK to be close to the US, since these two countries are relatively 
similar, compared to France and Germany where investor protection is rather weak. 
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We find that, even though the vast majority of share buyback announcements took 
place in the UK, in line with previous evidence (Rau and Vermaelen, 2002), because 
of corporate culture and relative lack of legal restrictions, the market valuation of 
repurchases amounts to only 1.68%, close to the 2.32% in Germany, though 
significantly higher than the 0.80% in France. In line with Renneboog and 
Trojanowski (2011), our results imply that besides the similarities between the US and 
the UK, there are still some differences in terms of corporate governance and 
institutional frameworks that might explain why in the UK the market reaction is 
relatively smaller than in the US. Moreover, the similarities in excess returns between 
the UK and Germany suggest that firms in weak investor protection countries are not 
less inclined to maximize shareholder value when they buy back their shares. This is 
contrary to Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and Brounen et al. (2004).  
We relate our results to a number of other possible explanations. First, we test 
whether firms with recurring announcements generate lower excess returns. Since 
firms are able to publicly disclose more information than they are legally required, 
they are likely to do so more frequently to enjoy a greater reputation of transparency 
(von Eije and Megginson, 2008). Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) find that firms that 
actually repurchase shares infrequently enjoy a higher market reaction. However, to 
our knowledge, no study to date investigates in detail the short-term market reaction 
to the initial and subsequent announcements. We argue that the former is likely to 
significantly reduce any information asymmetries, and, therefore, the initial signal 
will carry higher information content as opposed to subsequent announcements. 
Consistent with these arguments, we find that the market reaction increases 
significantly to 2.01% for initial, compared to 0.98% for subsequent announcements. 
However, in France, the market reaction to both announcements is relatively similar.  
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More recent studies suggest that share buybacks announced in the post-1990s do 
not necessarily lead to shareholder wealth maximization (Rosenthal and Sinha, 2011), 
or that the credibility of their undervaluation signal depends on whether repurchases 
are timed, for example, around executives¶ trades (Andriosopoulos and Hoque, 2014; 
Babenko et al., 2012; Bonaimé and Ryngaert, 2013; Chen et al., 2014). While we do 
not have data on insider trading around share repurchases announcements, we did find 
that the announcement date excess returns vary across time. We use natural 
experiments based on changes in regulatory regimes within and across our countries 
to assess further this time varying effect. We find that the November 2003 regulatory 
change in the UK, which allowed repurchases to be kept as treasury stock, affected 
substantially the market valuation of share repurchases as the announcement date 
market reaction decreased significantly from 2.95% to 0.72%. These results suggest 
that this reform has decreased the signaling role of share repurchases as it increased 
the ability of bad firms to announce share repurchases because the commitment to 
cancel the repurchased shares is alleviated. It may have also increased the 
shareholders¶ concerns of potential market manipulation via share repurchases.  
Within this market manipulation context, we test the impact of the European 
Union¶V 0DUNHW$EXVH'LUHFWLYH(&³0$'´, aimed at stabilizing financial 
instruments across Europe. The adoption of this directive can potentially have a 
positive effect, because it LQWURGXFHG D ³VDIH harbor´ IRU VWRFN UHSXUFKDVHV, as it 
reduced the cost of capital, and increased market liquidity (Christensen et al., 2012) 
and the propensity to buy back shares (Siems and De Cesari, 2012). Using the 
effective implementation date in each of our countries, we find no evidence that its 
implementation affected the market reaction to share repurchase announcements. 
Hence, our results also do not support the recent claims by the European Commission 
(FINNOV, 2012) that share repurchases are used to attain short-term boosts in share 
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prices. Similarly, unlike previous studies (e.g., Alzahrani and Lasfer, 2012; Grullon 
and Michaely, 2002; Keswani et al., 2007; Rau and Vermaelen, 2002), but in line with 
Bagwell and Shoven (1989) and Dittmar (2000), we GRQ¶W ILQGVWURQJ evidence that 
taxation affects the market valuation of share repurchases, independently of 
governance levels. 
We contribute to the previously documented, predominantly single-country, 
market valuation of share repurchases in several ways. We show that across the three 
major European countries, the market reaction to share repurchases announcements is 
positive, but, compared to the US, the signaling effect is relatively small and depends 
on institutional settings. Moreover, in the US share prices decrease (increase) in the 
pre- (post-) announcement period (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; 
Vermaelen, 1981), suggesting that managers announce their intention to buy back 
shares when they think that their firm is undervalued, but the market tends to under-
react to such announcements, because it underestimates the extent to which the 
UHSXUFKDVH UHGXFHV WKH ILUP¶V FRVW RI capital (Grullon and Michaely, 2004), or it  
assumes that all shareholders tender their shares, which is empirically incorrect, and 
creates the appearance of an under-reaction (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009). We show 
that the excess returns are confined mainly to the announcement date, suggesting that 
share repurchases do not signal undervaluation, but, at the same time, they do not lead 
to under-reaction, in line with Ginglinger and L¶+HU  LQ)UDQFH, and Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) and Oswald and Young (2004) in the UK. In the post-
announcement period, the excess returns are positive only in the UK when 
repurchased shares are cancelled. Overall, unlike Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2003), 
we show that repurchases are not strong signals used solely by good firms for whom it 
is not costly to DWWUDFWWKHPDUNHW¶VVFUXWLQ\. Our results imply that bad firms do not 
refrain from announcing their intention to repurchase shares regardless of the fact that 
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they may be scrutinized1, as share repurchases trigger a moderate market reaction 
confined only to the announcement date. The relatively weak market reaction around 
share repurchases announcements in our countries is also not consistent with Huang 
and Thakor (2013) who argue that firms buy back their stocks to improve their 
investor-management disagreements, and/or the Banerjee et al. (2013) overconfident 
PDQDJHUV¶H[FHVVLYHRSWLPLVP.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
underpinning of our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results. The conclusions are in Section 5. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. The impact of institutional and legal settings 
Previous studies on the market reaction to share repurchases are predominantly 
focused on a single country (see, for example, Ikenberry et al. (2000) for Canada; 
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) for France; Bessler et al. (2009) and Hacketal and 
Zdantchouk (2006) for Germany; Oswald and Young (2004) for the UK; and 
Ikenberry et al. (1995), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Bonaimé (2012) for the US). 
We extend this analysis to a number of countries with different institutional settings.  
The legislation on share repurchases is relatively standardized across the 
member countries of the European Union (EU). Unlike the US where repurchases are 
                                                 
1
 Other studies show that the impact of signaling depends on the method of shares repurchases, as the 
market reacts more to the announcement of fixed price tender offer than to open market share 
repurchases (e.g. Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000; Louis and White, 2007; Vermaelen, 1981; Peyer and 
Vermaelen, 2009). However, since most firms use open market repurchases and many do not actually 
buy back their stock (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) they are likely to be more concerned with the 
announcement of intention when the signal works (Bhattacharya and Dittmar, 2003; McNally, 1999). 
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approved only by the board of directors with no timing, price and volume restrictions, 
the EU legislation stipulates that firms need the shareholders¶ approval at the general 
shareholder meeting. This approval is for a maximum of 18 months, the proportion of 
shares to repurchase is limited to 10 % RI WKH ILUP¶V LVVXHG FDSLWDO, the repurchase 
price range is disclosed, and repurchases should be made out of distributable profits 
only.2 These arguments suggest that the market valuation of repurchases and the 
impact of the reforms will be homogeneous across our countries, ceteris paribus. 
However, there are significant regulatory differences across our countries. In 
France open market share repurchases became legal in July 2, 1998. This decision 
needs to be authorized by shareholders, and, up to 2004, indirectly by the Autorité des 
marchés financiers, AMF, the financial regulator.3 The shares repurchased can be 
cancelled or kept as treasury stock (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007). In Germany share 
repurchases were mainly illegal before May 1, 1998, as they are perceived to be a 
prohibited repayment of capital. In contrast, in the UK share repurchases have been 
legal since 1981, and share repurchased have to be cancelled, until 2003 when they 
can be keep as treasury stocks.  
Our countries differ also in terms of information asymmetries, corporate culture, 
practices, and tax systems (Alzahrani and Lasfer, 2012; von Eije and Megginson, 
2008). We focus on differences in terms of shareholder protection and ownership, 
corporate governance frameworks, and law enforcement (Faccio and Lang, 2000; La 
                                                 
2
 These rules are included in the Second Council (Council of the European Communities) Directive 
77/91/EEC in 1976. See Kim et al (2004) for details.  
3
 Before 2004 buyback programmes needed to be adopted by the AGM and the announcement 
documents approved by the AMF. After 2004, shareholder approval is still required, but firms need to 
send only a note to the regulator explaining the repurchase programme, before disclosing the news to 
shareholders. We thank Edith Ginglinger from University Paris Dauphine for these clarifications. 
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Porta et al., 2000; Morck et al., 2005; Spamann, 2010). Since a share buyback is a 
SRSXODU IRUP RI FRUSRUDWH SD\RXW LW FDQ EH XVHG IRU EHWWHU DOLJQLQJ PDQDJHPHQW¶V
interests with those of outside shareholders when managers either own shares and/or 
have stock options in the firm (Brown et al., 2007). However, the regulatory 
framework that affects the level of shareholder protection directly affects the 
PDQDJHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR H[Wract substantial benefits from minority shareholders such as 
WKH XVH RI WKH ILUP¶V FDVK, leading to higher agency costs (La Porta et al., 2002). 
Therefore, in countries with lower investor protection managers will be more 
entrenched and, consequently, firms will hold more cash (e.g., Kalcheva and Lins, 
2007; Dittmar et al., 2003), and shareholders will value firms¶ liquid assets at a 
discount (Pinkowitz et al., 2006). These arguments suggest that the institutional and 
regulatory heterogeneity across countries leads to differences in information 
asymmetries, management attitude toward shareholder value maximization, and the 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR LPSRVH GLVFLSOLQDU\ FRQWUROV RQ PDQDJHUV VXFK DV FRUSRUDWH
payouts. We, therefore, expect a higher market valuation of share repurchases in the 
UK where shareholder protection is stronger than France and Germany, in line with 
Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and Brounen et al. (2004). Hence, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: The market reaction to open market share repurchase announcements is 
higher in the UK compared to France and Germany. 
2.2. Initial vs. Subsequent announcement and market reaction 
It is widely documented that when firms announce their intention to repurchase 
shares the market reacts positively (Chan et al., 2004*LQJOLQJHU DQG /¶+HU; 
Ikenberry et al., 1995; Vermaelen, 1981). Because of its encompassing nature as an 
investment, share repurchases (among other corporate decisions) have inherent 
benefits such as signaling of undervaluation, mitigation of agency costs, more tax-
 9 
efficient payout to shareholders, and debtholder expropriation, resulting in positive 
excess stock returns on the announcement day and in the post-event period. However, 
since open market repurchases are not firm commitments,4 unlike cash dividends or 
tender offer buybacks,5 they are costless signals (Huang and Thakor, 2013). On the 
other hand, Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2003) argue that such announcements attract 
WKHPDUNHW¶V VFUXWLQ\ and lead to a positive market reaction, because bad firms will 
not mimic this action to avoid being discovered. Consistent with these arguments, 
Bonaimé (2012) finds that firms with high prior completion rates are more credible 
and their announcements lead to higher excess returns. 
We test the signaling hypothesis by focusing on the periodicity of repurchases. 
von Eije and Megginson (2008) argue that firms that make more frequent 
announcements can earn a reputation of transparency. Jagannathan and Stephens 
(2003) find that firms that do not repurchase shares frequently display a significantly 
higher market reaction during the three days of the share buyback. However, they 
analyze the deviation of the market reaction to varying frequencies of actual rather 
than the announcements of intention to repurchase. We focus on the latter and expect 
a higher market reaction for the initial repurchase announcements, as subsequent 
                                                 
4
 Lie (2005) shows that investors cannot predict firms that actually repurchase their shares. Bonaimé 
(2012) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report average three-year buyback completion rates of about 
70% of the targeted amount. 7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHVLJQDOKDVDOUHDG\ZRUNHGDVWKHPDUNHW¶VVFUXWLQ\ is 
attracted (Bhattacharya and Dittmar, 2003), and the goal of increasing the share price is achieved 
(McNally, 1999). 
5
 The market reaction to fixed price share repurchases is higher (e.g. Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000; 
Louis and White, 2007; Vermaelen, 1981; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005) because the premium paid on 
the tendered shares is seen by the market as a costly signal, thus bearing more credibility. 
 10 
announcements are likely to be routine and the market is already more accustomed to 
their inherent information content. Therefore, our second hypothesis is: 
H2: The initial announcement of intention to repurchase shares will result in 
greater market reaction than subsequent announcements.  
2.3. The impact of the EU market regulation  
Since 2003, share repurchases have become subject to regulations under the 
provisions of the Market Abuse Directive, which intends to harmonize European 
securities regulations concerning the manipulation of financial markets.6 This 
directive introduced common measures to prevent and detect market abuse and price 
manipulation, and to ensure a consistent and reliable flow of information to the 
market. To achieve this goal, this directive specified a set of provisions relating to the 
execution of share repurchase programs and especially their disclosure requirements, 
such as the daily volume of open market share repurchase activities and the price paid 
for the repurchased shares. Open market share repurchases are likely to be affected by 
this directive, because managers can time their announcements, even though the 
directive considers that they do not amount to market abuse if they qualify for the, so-
called, safe harbor status, and conform to the requirements set out in the implementing 
measures. The impact of this reform depends RQWKHH[LVWLQJQDWLRQDOODZV¶GLVSDULW\
from the provisions of this directive and on the level of information asymmetry. In 
line with Siems and De Cesari (2012), we expect the implementation of this directive 
                                                 
6
 This European Regulation no. 2273/2003 became effective in 1 July 2005 in the UK, with the 
adoption of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2005, in 24 
November 2004 in France, with the publication of the AMF General Regulation, and in 29 October 
 LQ*HUPDQ\)RUGHWDLOVVHH:HOFKHWDO HDFKFRXQWU\¶V ILQDQFLDO UHJXODWRU\ERG\DQG
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R2273:EN:HTML). 
 11 
to decrease the market reaction to share repurchase announcements, as this reform 
increased market liquidity and decreased the costs of capital (Christensen et al., 2012), 
consequently mitigating information asymmetries.7 This leads to our next hypothesis: 
H3: The market reaction to open market share repurchases is lower following 
the Market Abuse Directive. 
2.4. Impact of the UK allowance to keep repurchased shares as Treasury stock 
Over our sample period, a number of domestic institutional reforms occurred in 
our countries. We focus on the 2003 rule which allows UK companies to keep the 
shares repurchased as Treasury stocks. Before December 2003, companies were not 
allowed to do so as any repurchased shares are legally cancelled. The 2003 reform 
gave UK firms greater flexibility to manage their capital, because they are then able to 
use the repurchased shares as currency in future acquisitions, to reissue them at a later 
date at relatively low cost, and to increase their stock liquidity and reduce short-term 
price instability, thereby smoothing the price discovery (De Cesari et al., 2011). We, 
therefore, expect a reduction in the announcement date market reaction, even though 
the number of open market share repurchase announcements may have increased in 
the post-2003 period, because the enhancement in the flexibility of open market 
repurchases reduced the ILUPV¶ commitment, as bad firms can easily mimic good 
firms, hence decreasing the signaling effect of the buyback announcement. Thus, our 
fourth hypothesis is the following: 
                                                 
7
 We could not analyse directly the impact of the October 2004 domestic reform in France when firms 
are allowed to keep treasury stocks (up to 10% of capital), but they could not resell them in the market, 
and the end of the AMF certification (see note 6), as this event coincides with the date when the Market 
Abuse Directive became effective. 
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H4: The market reaction to open market share repurchases in the UK will be 
lower following the ability of firms to kept repurchased shares as Treasury stock. 
3. Data and Methodology 
We search Perfect Analysis and Factiva databases for any news on the intention 
to repurchase ordinary shares in the open market in France, Germany and the UK. We 
hand-collect the announcement dates, the proportion and/or the number of shares the 
firms intend to repurchase.8 We exclude repurchases of B-shares, preference shares, 
and American or Global Depositary Receipts (ADRs or GDRs) because they are less 
likely to be related to our testable hypotheses. Finally, we exclude firms with missing 
stock price and accounting data on DataStream. Our final sample includes 970 
announcements of intention to repurchase shares in 1997 to 2006, split into 513 (53%) 
in the UK, 263 (27%) in France, and 194 (20%) in Germany. 
Figure 1 shows the annual distribution of our sample and the number of cross-
country announcements of intention to repurchase shares. The announcements are 
volatile, ranging from 13 in 1997 to 145 in 2006. Moreover, with the exception of 
2000, the majority of announcements occurred in the UK where they picked in 2005, 
coinciding with the implementation of the EU directive. In France, there is a steady 
increase for the two years after share repurchases are made easier for firms to 
                                                 
8
 Factiva provides several types of announcements, including (a) an initial statement of intention to 
obtain the VKDUHKROGHUV¶general meeting authorization for a share repurchase program, (b) a repurchase 
resolution passed by shareholders at a general meeting, and (c) the actual share buyback transactions. 
We focus only on (a). The standardization of the announcements dates increases the comparability of 
our results, as Hackethal and Zdantchouk (2006) find significant differences in the market reaction to 
the initial statements of *HUPDQILUPVWKDWVHHNWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶DSSURYDOIRUDVKDUHUHSXUFKDVHplan 
of +2.53%, compared to +5.97% for announcements of an imminent share repurchases. 
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undertake; reaching their peak in 2000. In Germany, the frequency is the lowest 
except in 2001 and 2005.  
Table 1 reports the time lapsed from the initial announcement of intention to 
repurchase shares to the subsequent announcements made by the same firm through 
the following ten years under study. The table shows that the overwhelming majority 
of the subsequent announcements (approximately 63%) occurred within the same year 
the initial announcement took place. The remaining 17% and 7% of announcements 
occurred one and two years after the initial announcement of intention to repurchase 
shares, respectively. Overall, a very small sample of subsequent announcements 
extended more than three years.9 Following Ikenberry et al. (1995), we apply a cut-off 
point of three years for classifying a share buyback announcement as a subsequent 
announcement.  
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here] 
We use the standard event study methodology to assess the stock price behavior 
around the announcement of intention to buy back shares. The market model 
coefficients i
D  and i
E are computed from regressing the returns of firm i against a 
representative market index in each country. The market returns are based on the 
FTSE All Share Index, DAX, and SBF 250 for UK, Germany, and France, 
respectively. Our estimation period spans from -255 to -21, and the event period is 
                                                 
9
 There are 84 announcements that occurred during 1997-1999, that are classified as initial 
announcements. We check whether these events are correctly classified as initial announcements. We 
find that only four have a preceding announcement during 1994-1996. The shortest time gap between 
the preceding announcements and the respective four announcements classified as initial in our sample 
is approximately 3 years, whereas the longest time gap is slightly more than 4 years. Therefore, the 
impact of treating these four announcements as initial announcements does not alter our findings. 
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from -20 to +20 trading days relative to the repurchase announcement, in line with 
Ikenberry et al. (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) and Zhang (2005). Following 
Ikenberry et al. (1995), we also report results based on [-1, +1] period to account for 
event date uncertainty. 
4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1. Market reaction to the announcement of repurchases  
Table 2 reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over various event 
windows and Figure 2 shows the trend in daily excess returns around the event period. 
Unlike US evidence (e.g., Ikenberry et al., 1995) where stock prices decrease by 
3.07% in the pre-event period, and increase by 3.54% during the event window [-1, 
+1], we find that the pre-announcement date CARs are not significant, and the event 
date CARs of +1.55% are lower.10 For the post event period [+2, +20] the CARs are 
positive but not significant, while in the US, they tend to be positive and significant. 
Our results suggest that share repurchases in Europe are not likely to be driven by 
undervaluation and the market does not under-react to their announcements.  
4.2. Impact of institutional and legal settings  
Since our results indicate that repurchases are not necessarily driven by 
undervaluation, we explore further the impact of other factors. Table 2 reports the 
distribution of excess returns across our countries to test for differences in 
institutional settings. The results indicate that the announcements date excess returns 
                                                 
10
 The excess returns are 0.93% (Ikenberry et al., 2000) and 0.87% (McNally, 1999) in Canada; 0.55% 
in France (GingliQJHU DQG /¶+HU  2.53% (Hacketal and Zdantchouk, 2006) and 6.7% (Seifert 
and Stehle, 2003) in Germany; 1.08% (Rau and Vermaelen, 2002) and 1.24% (Oswald and Young, 
2004) in the UK; and  2.57% (Grullon and Michaely, 2002) and 1.81% (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005) in 
the US. 
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are significantly lower in France, but they are similar in Germany and the UK. 
Interestingly, while in France and Germany the pre- and post-announcement returns 
are not significant, there is some evidence of positive post-announcement drift, 
suggesting that the market may be under-reacting to the announcement of 
repurchases. The differences in market reaction across our countries suggest that our 
results may be affected by country effects, which we consider in our regressions. 
However, since UK and Germany generate similar excess returns, while their 
corporate governance systems are different, the positive market reaction to share 
repurchases is not likely to reflect the prospects of reducing agency costs.  
4.3. Reaction to initial vs. subsequent announcements 
We test the hypothesis that the signaling role of share repurchases is stronger on 
the initial announcement, as subsequent announcements may be expected and become 
routine (H2). Table 2 reports the CARs for each sub-group. Figure 2 portrays the daily 
CARs for the pooled sample across the three countries, while Figures 3A and 3B 
illustrate the country specific CARs. The results indicate significant differences across 
the two announcements. In particular, while the initial announcement results in excess 
returns of 2.01%, subsequent announcements generate significantly lower returns of 
only 0.98%. Overall, our results indicate that the initial announcements contain more 
information, but, since the returns on subsequent announcement dates are also 
significant, our results imply that they are not fully expected by the market. 
We assess further this effect across our countries. The remaining columns in 
Table 2 indicate that the announcement date excess returns in France are relatively 
similar, and the rather smaller event-day positive performance is short lived, as the 
post-event returns are negative, although not significant. In contrast, in Germany and 
UK, the initial announcements carry significantly higher market impact, and the 
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subsequent announcements are not significant. In the UK, while the market reaction is 
positive and significant for both the initial and subsequent announcements, they carry 
on being significant only for the initial repurchases.  
[Insert Table 2 and Figures 2, 3A and 3B here] 
4.4. The effects of regulatory changes 
In this section we assess the impact of the 2003 Market Abuse Directive and 
the UK treatment of repurchases as treasury shares in 2003. Table 3 reports the impact 
of these reforms on the market valuation of share repurchases. We report these effects 
separately for each country as the exact enactment of the EU directive is not 
standardized across our countries. 
In France this reform did not have any major impact. In contrast, in Germany, 
the EU Directive reduced significantly the announcement dates excess returns from 
2.97% to 1.04%. Moreover, prior to its adoption, the pre-announcement returns are 
negative and significant. However, since the post-announcement returns are not 
statistically significant both before and after its implementation, we conclude that it is 
only before the enactment of this directive that firms are more likely to repurchase 
shares because of short term undervaluation.  
In the UK, we start first by analyzing the impact of the regulation on the 
accounting treatment of repurchased shares. The results show that the announcement 
date excess returns decreased significantly from 2.95% before the regulation that 
made repurchased shares to be cancelled to 0.72% when they can be treated as 
treasury stocks. Panel B shows that this drop is highly significant relative to the 
remaining periods, in line with our predictions in hypothesis H4. The results suggest 
that, by enabling firms to keep repurchased shares as treasury shares, which could be 
floated again in the market, thereby smoothing the price discovery (De Cesari et al., 
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2011), the signaling role of share repurchases became weaker. This is because before 
this regulation firms were required to cancel the repurchased shares, thus, leaving 
smaller room for potential market interference, and low quality firms would be less 
likely to mimic good firms.  
Following the implementation of the EU Directive, the excess returns 
decreased further to 0.41%. Even though the event day reaction is significantly 
different from the first sub-period when repurchased shares are cancelled, it is not 
significantly different from the market reaction during the second sub-period when 
they can be kept as treasury stocks. The results provide only partial support for 
hypothesis H3. Moreover, while in the pre-announcement dates none of the excess 
returns are significant, in the post-event period they are positive and significant when 
shares repurchased are cancelled and when the directive is implemented. However, 
since Panel B shows that the announcement date excess returns are not statistically 
different across these two periods, we conclude that the implementation of this reform 
does not have a significant effect on the market reaction to repurchases in the UK, in 
line with France, above. This is probably because most of the GLUHFWLYH¶V new 
requirements, including the disclosure of the objective of the program, the maximum 
number of shares to be acquired, and the duration of the period for which 
authorization for the program has been given, are similar to the national regulation, 
and, thus, they were already undertaken by firms in these countries.  
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
4.4. The drivers of the announcement-date market reaction 
Our univariate results could be affected by firm and other country fundamentals, 
and by time effects, as Amihud and Li (2006) find that the overall effect of dividend 
increase announcements on prices has declined over time, particularly since the tax 
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and regulatory changes are relatively more recent. We account for these effects by 
running the following pooled regressions:  
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where i represents the firm, t represents time measured by the calendar year end, and 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for the three respective days surrounding the 
announcement day. We include dummies to control for industry effects. The summary 
statistics are reported Appendix 1.11  
Our first hypothesis stipulates that the market reaction will be higher in 
countries with high governance systems. Following Pinkowitz et al. (2006), we 
control for country effects using two indices developed from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG): Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality which account for 
investor protection and the rule of law. We find similar results when we use country 
dummy variables. We test the predictions of our second hypothesis that the initial 
announcement causes a greater market reaction than the subsequent announcements 
by including Initial, a binary variable equal to one for initial announcement and zero 
otherwise. We control for the impact of the EU Market Abuse Directive, as discussed 
in our third hypothesis  with the variable EU Directive, which is equal to one when an 
share buyback announcement occurred after the EU directive became effective in each 
country and zero otherwise. Finally, we employ Treasury, a binary variable equal to 
one if the announcements in the UK are made in the post-December 2003 period, to 
test our fourth hypothesis. 
                                                 
11
 We also replicate our estimations by running country-level regressions. The results, not reported for 
space considerations, remain qualitatively the same.  
(1) 
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We use a number of control variables identified in previous studies to have an 
impact on the market valuation of share repurchases. All the accounting based 
variables are lagged one year. We follow Dittmar (2000) and Grullon and Michaely 
(2002) and define leverage as the ratio of total debt to total assets at the end of the 
calendar year prior to the announcement date. We find similar results when we use the 
median net debt to total assets ratio of each respective industry of the repurchasing 
firm, at the end of the calendar year prior to the announcement, and net debt to total 
assets ratio, as in Dittmar (2000). We expect leverage to be positively related to the 
announcement date excess returns. We use a number of variables to capture the 
undervaluation hypothesis which predicts that firms repurchase their shares when 
their current share price is, according to the managers who are expected to be better 
informed than the market, lower than its true value (e.g. Ikenberry et al., 1995; 
Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003; Dittmar, 2000). The first is the Pre 20-days return, 
defined as the daily cumulative market adjusted return for the period of 22 to 2 days 
prior to the announcement date, as a proxy for the short term undervaluation. To 
capture the longer period undervaluation and momentum effect, we use the daily 
cumulative market adjusted return for the period of 255 to 2 days prior to the 
announcement date, Pre 1-year return, and MB, the market to book ratio, as Ikenberry 
et al. (1995) report that firms with low MB earn abnormal returns in the subsequent 
periods, in line with the undervaluation hypothesis. This hypothesis also suggests that 
repurchasing firms have a high degree of information asymmetry, which is likely to 
be prevalent in small firms, since they have less coverage by analysts and the media 
(Vermaelen, 1981). As in Dittmar (2000), Grullon and Michaely (2002), and 
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011), we use Size WKH QDWXUDO ORJDULWKP RI D ILUP¶V
market capitalization, to proxy for this effect. We find similar results when we use the 
book value of total assets as a size proxy.  
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Oded (2011) assesses the differences of open market share repurchases and 
tender offers from a shareholder ownership perspective, predicting that a higher 
ownership concentration will lead to a higher likelihood of an open market share 
repurchase, since only large shareholders can bear the associated information costs in 
tender offers. In contrast, the higher the ownership concentration the higher the level 
of adverse selection, and, hence, the higher the premium involved in share buyback. 
Moreover, higher ownership concentration leads to information asymmetry that is 
higher (lower) for smaller (large) shareholders. We follow Mitchell and Dharmawan 
(2007) and employ Ownership concentration, the ratio of closely held shares12 over 
the number of shares outstanding, to control for this effect.   
The excess cash flow hypothesis stipulates that firms repurchase their stock to 
distribute their excess capital and to mitigate the potential agency conflicts (Jensen, 
1986). Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that repurchasing firms decrease their 
capital expenditures and research and development expenses, while Oswald and 
Young (2008) find that non-repurchasing firms are more likely to overinvest. 
Similarly, Dittmar (2000) and Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) find that firms with 
excess cash and fewer investment opportunities are more likely to repurchase their 
shares. We include Cash GHILQHG DV WKH ILUP¶V QHW LQFRPH EHIRUH WD[HV SOXV
depreciation and changes in deferred taxes and other deferred charges over total 
assets, at the end of the year prior to the share repurchase announcement.  
                                                 
12
 The variable closely held shares is taken from Worldscope database, and represents shares held by 
insiders, officers, directors and their immediate families, in trust and by any other corporation (except 
shares held in a fiduciary capacity by banks or other financial institutions), pension/benefit plans, and 
individuals who hold 5% (3% in UK) or more of the outstanding shares. It excludes shares under option 
exercisable within sixty days, shares held in a fiduciary capacity, those held by insurance companies, 
and preferred stock or debentures that are convertible into common shares.  
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The tax differential between dividend and capital gains can make share 
repurchases more valuable to shareholders than cash dividends when capital gains tax 
rate is lower than the personal income tax rate (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2002). 
However, the empirical evidence provided to date on the tax impact is mixed. While 
Bagwell and Shoven (1989), Julio and Ikenberry (2004) and Dittmar (2000) for US 
and Oswald and Young (2008) for UK find no evidence that tax regulations affect 
significantly payout policies, Chetty and Saez (2005) find a strong impact of the 2003 
dividend tax reform in the US, and Brown et al. (2007) show that this tax reform 
affected the payout choice, enhancing the substitutability between cash dividends and 
buybacks. Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) find that corporate payouts are affected by tax, 
corporate and institutional factors. Grullon and Michaely (2002), Keswani et al. 
(2007), Lie and Lie (1999) and Rau and Vermaelen (2002) show that when more 
favorable measures are taken towards share repurchases, then both share repurchasing 
announcements and activity increase. Lie and Lie (1999) report that managers are 
PRUH VHQVLWLYH WR WKH VKDUHKROGHUV¶ WD[ WKUHVKROG ZKHQ D ODUJH IUDFWLRQ RI VKDUHV LV
owned by institutional investors, because they can be more capable and willing to 
inform managers about the tax implications of different cash disbursements. We 
follow Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) and include Tax Differential, the ratio of effective 
income tax relative to the effective tax on share buybacks, to test for the effect of tax.  
Grullon and Michaely (2002) argue that, in addition to the tax advantage, share 
buybacks substitute cash dividends due to the flexibility on the timing and execution. 
Jiang et al. (2013) find that managers consider both dividends and share buybacks 
when making a payout, suggesting that these two cash disbursements are substitutes. 
Skinner (2008) finds that younger firms that have not paid cash dividends are more 
likely to repurchase their shares instead of committing to pay cash dividends, and that 
the overall significance of dividend payers is diminishing over time, suggesting that 
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share repurchases become the dominant form of payouts. However, Jagannathan et al. 
(2000), Dittmar (2000) in the US, and Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) in Australia 
find that share repurchases supplement cash dividends. In their extensive review on 
payout policies, Farre-Mensa et al. (2014) conclude that changes in compensation 
practices and management incentives are better able to explain the significant 
substitution of cash dividends by repurchases which became the prime vehicle for 
corporate payouts over the last 30 years, than the traditional motives, such as taxes, 
agency costs and signalling. We use Dividend, the ratio of cash dividends to earnings, 
to account for these effects.13  
Finally, we control for firms listed in secondary markets and include the dummy 
variables AIM and Neuer Markt, which take the value of one for firms listed in the 
UK and German secondary markets, respectively and zero otherwise. 
Panel A of Table 4, reports the results from the pooled regressions. We do not 
find strong evidence of the impact of the investor protection indices on the market 
reaction to the announcement of share repurchases, in line with our univariate results, 
suggesting that share repurchases are less likely to be driven by agency conflicts. 
These results do not provide support to our Hypothesis H1. In contrast, there is some 
evidence that the initial announcement carries higher information content, and, in 
effect, causing a stronger market reaction, which is consistent with our hypothesis H2. 
Similarly, the dummy for the change in the accounting treatment of repurchases in the 
UK, Treasury, is mainly negative and significant, suggesting that the signaling role of 
repurchases is reduced when UK companies are allowed to keep shares repurchased 
                                                 
13
 We also follow Oswald and Young (2008) and use a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has paid 
cash dividends in the year prior to the repurchasing announcement and zero otherwise, and we use the 
ratio of total cash dividends divided by total assets and dividend yield. The results remain the same. 
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as treasury stocks. These results provide support for hypothesis H4, and reflect also 
WKH PDUNHW¶V FRQFHUQ RYHU SRWHQWLDO PDUNHW LQWHUIHUHQFH E\ WKH ILUP ZLWK WKHLU
increased flexibility of floating again the repurchased shares.   
The EU Directive is not significant, suggesting that the impact of the 
implementation of this reform and the amendments of the disclosure¶V obligations 
pertaining to share repurchases from this directive, have not affected the market 
valuation of share repurchases. These results do not provide support to our hypothesis 
H3. In unreported results, we find no impact of the EU Directive on the market 
reaction in any specific country in our sample. This is probably because most of these 
new requirements, including the disclosure of the full details of the program, the 
maximum number of shares to be acquired, and the duration of the period for which 
authorization for the program has been given for firms to benefit from the safe harbor 
provided by the buyback regulation, are already part of the national legislations. 
These results are consistent with our previous findings from the univariate analysis. 
In terms of control variables, Table 4 indicates that leverage does not have a 
strong impact, suggesting that share repurchases are not likely to be undertaken to 
increase leverage and gain from the tax shields. Firm size is inversely related to the 
PDUNHW¶V UHDFWLRQ WR VKDUH UHSXUFKDVHV, in line with Ikenberry et al. (1995) and 
Grullon and Michaely (2002). This is due to higher information asymmetries 
experienced by smaller firms which GUDZWKHPDUNHW¶VVFUXWLQ\ZLWKWKHLULQWHQWLRQWR
repurchase shares, as argued by Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2003), consequently 
leading to a higher market reaction. The impact of signaling undervaluation is mixed 
as, while the coefficient of the Pre-One-Year Returns is negative and significant, MB 
is not significant, and the Pre-20-Days Returns are positive, in contrast to the 
prediction of this hypothesis (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998).  
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Ownership concentration is not statistically significant while cash holding is 
negative, suggesting that the market prefers the free cash flow to be retained rather 
than returned to the shareholders in the form of share repurchases. These results 
complement the findings based on the Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality, and 
suggest that, in contrast to the predictions of our hypothesis H1, the market does not 
strongly view repurchases as a way of mitigating the agency conflicts.  
The results show no evidence of dividends having an impact on the market 
reaction to share buybacks, suggesting that share buybacks and cash dividends are 
independent, in contrast to Jagannathan et al. (2000) who show that they are 
complimentary. The tax differential variable has a mixed impact on the market 
reaction, suggesting the market does not value fully the tax saved by shareholders 
when firms buyback their shares instead of paying dividends. Finally, the positive 
impact of Neuer Markt is consistent with Bessler et al. (2009) who find a market 
reaction of 5.88% for Neuer Markt firms and 1.65% for DAX/MDAX firms, 
suggesting that small and high-growth firms are more likely to experience a higher 
market reaction, in line with the information asymmetry hypothesis. However, this 
does not apply to firms listed in AIM. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.5. Robustness checks 
We use a number of additional tests to assess the robustness of our results. First, 
we check that the results are not driven by a potential selection bias of which 
announcement is classified as initial or subsequent by running our regressions only for 
the sub-sample of initial announcements. The results reported in Panel B of Table 4, 
remain qualitatively the same. The only major exception is the significance of Rule of 
Law, which is positive and significant, and Treasury became less significant.  
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We then consider the potential sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979) using the 
Heckman et al. (1997) two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage we estimate a 
probit model with the dependent variable equal to one if a firm makes an 
announcement of its intention to repurchase shares and zero otherwise, across all 
listed firms in the three countries, during the time span of our study. We use a number 
of explanatory variables commonly used in the payout policy literature, including firm 
size, market-to-book, leverage, ownership concentration, cash, and dividend yield, 
along with the variables rule of law and regulatory quality to control for country 
effects, and industry and time dummies. From the first stage we estimate the inverse 
Mill¶s ratio which is then included as an additional control variable in the second 
stage regressions where the dependent variable is the event window market 
announcement CARi,-1,+1. The results reported in Table 5 show that the inverse Mill¶s 
ratio is not significant across any model specification suggesting there is no sample 
selection bias. Moreover, even with the inclusion of the statistically insignificant 
,QYHUVH0LOO¶V UDWLRour results remain qualitatively the same. Therefore, the results 
reported in Table 4 are robust and do not suffer from self-selection bias.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5. Conclusions 
We analyze the impact of various cross-country institutional settings on the 
market reaction to the announcement of open market share repurchases across major 
European countries. We find that the average market reaction is lower than in the US 
and is not dependent on the level of investor protection, as there is no significant 
difference between Germany and the UK, even though the excess returns are smaller 
in France. Second, we find that the market valuation depends on the periodicity of the 
announcements. Since many European firms announce repurchases continuously 
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through time, we find significantly higher announcement date excess returns to the 
initial announcement, suggesting that the first announcement significantly reduces any 
information asymmetries, and, therefore, its signal carries higher information content 
as opposed to subsequent announcements. Third, we report that the adoption of the 
EU Market Abuse Directive which introduced a more rigorous disclosure regime, 
hence aiming to reduce information asymmetries, did not affect significantly the 
market reaction to share repurchases announcements. Siems and De Cesari (2012) 
argue that open market repurchases can be considered as a way of manipulating the 
market. Therefore, the adoption of this directive is expected to reduce the propensity 
of firms to announce their intention to buy back shares, and consequently, they would 
do so only in the case when the information content is low. Our results imply that this 
legislation may not have achieved its aim of restricting companies from potential 
market manipulation, as it did not have any impact on the announcement date market 
reaction to repurchases. Nevertheless, since subsequent EU legislation provided a safe 
harbor for share repurchasing firms, our results imply that the new requirements on 
buybacks are not informative. Finally, we find a significant drop in excess returns 
following the change in legislation in the UK that allowed companies to treat their 
repurchased shares as treasury stocks. 
Our analysis may suffer from a set of limitations beyond our control. Since 
many of our sample firms are international, they may not be subject to regulations of 
their country of registration. They may also have other ways of managing their 
leverage, signaling and dividends, and their accounting numbers may not be 
comparable. We also do not have data on firm level shareholding and their respective 
tax rates to compute the preferences for repurchases. While these issues are beyond 
the scope of our research because of data unavailability, the extent to which their 
inclusion will strengthen or alter our results is a subject of further research. 
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Table 1. Sample description and time-lapse of subsequent open market share repurchase announcements.  
This table reports the descriptive statistics on the time that lapses between the initial and the subsequent of the subsequent announcements from a sample of 
356 subsequent announcements, of which 211, 79 and 66 are made in the UK, France and Germany, respectively. The total number of announcements 
(including unique announcement) is 970 split into 513 in the UK, 263 in France and 194 in Germany over the period 1997 to 2006. 
 
  All countries 
 
United Kingdom   France   Germany   
 
N 
% of 
subsequent % of Total 
 
N 
% of 
subsequent 
% of 
Total 
 
N 
% of 
subsequent 
% of 
Total 
 
N 
% of 
subsequent 
% of 
Total 
0-1 year 225 63.20% 23.20% 
 
146 69.19% 28.46% 
 
37 46.84% 14.07% 
 
42 63.64% 21.65% 
1 to 2 years 61 17.13% 6.29% 
 
32 15.17% 6.24% 
 
14 17.72% 5.32% 
 
15 22.73% 7.73% 
2 to 3 years 25 7.02% 2.58% 
 
14 6.64% 2.73% 
 
7 8.86% 2.66% 
 
4 6.06% 2.06% 
3 to 4 years 17 4.78% 1.75% 
 
8 3.79% 1.56% 
 
8 10.13% 3.04% 
 
1 1.52% 0.52% 
4 to 5 years 15 4.21% 1.55% 
 
2 0.95% 0.39% 
 
11 13.92% 4.18% 
 
2 3.03% 1.03% 
5 to 6 years 6 1.69% 0.62% 
 
4 1.90% 0.78% 
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 
 
2 3.03% 1.03% 
6 to 7 years 5 1.40% 0.52% 
 
3 1.42% 0.58% 
 
2 2.53% 0.76% 
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 
7 to 8 years 1 0.28% 0.10% 
 
1 0.47% 0.19% 
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 
>8 years 1 0.28% 0.10% 
 
1 0.47% 0.19% 
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 
 
0 0.00% 0.00% 
Announcements 
               Subsequent  356 100% 36.70% 
 
211 100% 41.13% 
 
79 100% 30.04% 
 
66 100% 34.02% 
Initial  614 
 
63.30% 
 
302 
 
58.87% 
 
184 
 
69.96% 
 
128 
 
65.98% 
Total  970 
 
100% 
 
513 
 
100% 
 
263 
 
100% 
 
194 
 
100% 
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Table 2. Cumulative average abnormal results for selected event windows 
The table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns for selected time-windows, for the entire sample and the two sub-groups of initial and subsequent announcements. 
The sample consists of 970 announcements of intention to repurchase shares on the open market in 1997 to 2006, of which 513 took place in the UK, 263 in France, and the 
remaining 194 in Germany. The abnormal returns are based on the market model with the coefficients computed over the -255 to -21 days before the announcement date. 
Initial announcements are announcements that appear for the first time in the sample through the ten year period of this study. Subsequent announcements are defined as 
announcements after the initial announcement. The t-statistics of the differences in means between our groups are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate p <0.01, <0.05, and 
<0.1, respectively. a denotes p <0.1 for the difference in mean average abnormal returns between UK and France;  b UK and Germany, and c France and Germany. 
 
 
  
All Countries UK France Germany 
  
Entire 
Sample Initial Subsequent 
Entire 
Sample Initial Subsequent 
Entire 
Sample Initial Subsequent 
Entire 
Sample Initial Subsequent 
N 970 614 356 513 302 211 263 184 79 194 128 66 
CAR -20,-2 -0.34% -0.39% -0.59% b0.13% 0.29% -0.68% -0.48% -0.72% 0.10% b-1.42% -1.51% -1.13% 
  
 
(0.307) 
 
(1.235) 
 
-0.574 
 
-0.261 
CAR -1,+1 1.55%*** 2.01%*** 0.98%** a1.68%*** a2.34%*** 1.02%*** a,c0.80%** a,c0.74% ** 0.94%* c2.32% *** c3.07%*** 0.90% 
  
 
(2.839) 
 
(2.777) 
 
-0.358 
 
(2.070) 
CAR +2,+20 0.31% 0.32% 0.18% a0.91%* a1.32%** 0.16% a-0.67% a-1.06% 0.25% 0.09% -0.01% 0.18% 
  
 
(0.207)   (1.668)   -1.185   -0.082 
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Table 3. Impact of regulatory changes. 
The table reports the CARs across different regulatory changes sub-periods, namely the 2003 
EU Directive, and the change in UK regulations that allowed the repurchased shares to be 
kept as treasury stock after 31/11/2003. The dates of implementation for the 2003 EU 
Directive in each country are from Welch et al. (2005) and the respective financial regulatory 
bodies. The sample includes 970 announcements of intention to repurchase shares on the open 
market (513 in the UK, 263 in France, 194 in Germany) from 1997 to 2006. The abnormal 
returns are based on the market model with the coefficients computed over the -255 to -21 
days before the announcement date. The p-values of the Welch F-test of means equality are in 
parentheses, and the number of observations for each sub-period is in brackets. Panel B 
reports the matrix containing the differences in CARs across the three sub-periods in the UK. 
***
,
 **
, 
* indicate p <0.01, <0.05, and <0.1, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Impact of Regulatory and Tax Changes per Country 
Time Periods  -20 to -2 -1 to +1 +2 to +20 
France 
01/01/1997 to 23/11/2004 [184] (1) 
(Directive 2003/6/EU) 
24/11/2004 to 31/12/2006 [79] (2) 
 
p-value Welch F-test 
 
-0.55% 
 
-0.37% 
 
0.900 
0.79%** 
 
0.82%** 
 
0.956 
-0.32% 
 
-1.98%** 
 
0.215 
Germany 
01/01/1997 to 28/10/2004 [129] (1) 
(Directive 2003/6/EU) 
29/10/2004 to 31/12/2006 [65] (2) 
 
p-value Welch F-test 
 
-2.24%** 
 
-0.22% 
 
0.094 
 
2.97%*** 
 
1.04%*** 
 
0.036 
 
0.74% 
 
-1.19% 
 
0.380 
 
UK 
01/01/1997 to 31/11/2003 [279] (1) 
(Repurchased shares can be kept as treasury shares) 
01/12/2003 to 30/06/2005 [117] (2) 
(Directive 2003/6/EU) 
01/07/2005 to 31/12/2006 [117] (3) 
 
p-value Welch F-test  
 
0.47% 
 
-0.30% 
 
-0.26% 
 
0.655 
2.95%*** 
 
0.72%*** 
 
0.41%** 
 
0.000 
1.26%** 
 
-0.55% 
 
1.55%*** 
 
0.009 
 
 
                                                       Panel B. Impact of Regulatory and Tax Changes in the UK  
                     (Differences in Means) 
 -20, -2 -1, +1 +2, +20 
 
01/01/1997 to 31/11/2003 [279] (1) 1  1  1  
(Repurchases kept as treasury shares)       
 
01/12/2003 to 30/06/2005 [117] (2) 0.770% 1 2.230%*** 1 1.810%* 1 
(Directive 2003/6/EU) (0.498)  (0.001)  (0.063)  
 
01/07/2005 to 31/12/2006 [117] (3) 0.730% -0.040% 2.540%*** 0.310% -0.290% -2.100%*** 
 (0.531) (0.957) (0.000) (0.596) (0.775) (0.009) 
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Table 4. Drivers of the market reaction to share repurchase announcements. 
The dependent variable is CARi,-1 to +1, the three-day cumulative abnormal return around the share repurchase 
announcement. Panel A reports the OLS estimation outputs for the entire pooled sample. Panel B reports the 
OLS estimation outputs only for the Initial announcements sub-sample. Rule of law and Regulatory Quality are 
indices measuring the quality of investor protection obtained from the International Country Risk Guide. Initial 
is a binary variable equals to one for initial announcements, and zero otherwise. EU Directive is a binary equal 
to one following the implementation date in each country. Treasury is a binary variable equal to one for post-
Dec. 1st, 2003 announcements when repurchased shares can be kept as treasury shares in the UK. Tax 
differential is the ratio of effective tax paid on dividends relative to capital gains tax. Leverage is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. MB is the market to book value of equity, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Pre-
One-Year Returns the cumulative abnormal returns one year before the announcement date, and Pre-20-Days 
Returns the daily cumulative market adjusted return for the period of 22 days prior and 2 days prior to the 
repurchase announcement. Size is the natural logarithm of a ILUP¶VPDUNHW value. Ownership Concentration is 
the percentage of closely held shares divided by the number of common shares outstanding. Closely held shares 
include shares held by management, corporations, benefit/pension schemes and individuals that hold 5% or 
more of the common shares outstanding. Cash LVWKHILUP¶VUDWLRRIQHWLQFRPHEHIRUHWD[HVSOXVGHSUHFLDWLRQ
and changes in deferred taxes and other deferred charges to total assets. Dividend is the ratio of total cash 
dividends to net income. AIM (Neuer Markt) is a binary variable equal to one for firms listed on the London 
Alternative Investment Market (Germany Neuer Markt) and zero otherwise. The accounting and ownership 
variables are at the end of the calendar year prior to the repurchase announcement. All our regressions include 
industry dummies. The p-values are based on cluster-adjusted robust standard errors at the firm level (Petersen, 
2009) and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate p <0.01, <0.05, and  <0.1, respectively.  
 
Panel A 
All announcements 
Panel B 
Initial announcements only 
 
Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 6 
Constant -0.092** -0.042 -0.042** -0.170*** -0.091 -0.047** 
 
(0.027) (0.383) (0.010) (0.001) (0.112) (0.019) 
Rule of Law 0.069 0.040 
 
0.175*** 0.131* 
 
 
(0.241) (0.528) 
 
(0.006) (0.084) 
 Regulatory Quality  0.045* 0.016 
 
0.059* 0.030 
 
 
(0.079) (0.525) 
 
(0.068) (0.315) 
 Initial  0.008* 
 
0.007* 
   
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.094) 
   EU Directive -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.180) (0.460) (0.514) (0.582) (0.932) (0.738) 
Treasury -0.011 -0.015** -0.014** 
 
-0.011 -0.014* 
 
(0.106) (0.025) (0.017) 
 
(0.215) (0.059) 
Leverage 0.010 0.027* 
 
0.012 0.037 
 
 
(0.474) (0.090) 
 
(0.512) (0.136) 
 MB 
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
 
  
(0.937) 
  
(0.557) 
 Pre 1-year returns -0.015** 
  
-0.022*** 
  
 
(0.043) 
  
(0.001) 
  Pre 20-days returns 
 
0.314*** 
  
0.266*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
  
(0.002) 
 Size 
 
-0.003** 
  
-0.004** 
 
  
(0.013) 
  
(0.017) 
 Ownership  
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
 concentration 
 
(0.401) 
  
(0.795) 
 Cash 
 
-0.051** -0.063*** 
 
-0.039 -0.054** 
  
(0.027) (0.002) 
 
(0.120) (0.021) 
Tax Differential 0.004 0.028 0.043*** -0.041 -0.008 0.047** 
 (0.900) (0.362) (0.004) (0.146) (0.823) (0.013) 
Dividend  0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.356) (0.115) (0.143) (0.401) (0.192) (0.148) 
AIM 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.022 0.018 0.024 
 
(0.254) (0.342) (0.174) (0.170) (0.387) (0.150) 
Neuer Markt 0.031** 0.023 0.026* 0.041** 0.042** 0.039** 
 
(0.019) (0.111) (0.050) (0.013) (0.042) (0.015) 
Obs. 878 761 848 555 463 532 
Adj. R2(%) 8.39 19.02 9.99 15.49 20.27 12.20 
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Table 5. Robustness checks 
This table controls for self-selection bias on the drivers of the market reaction to share repurchase 
announcements. The dependent variable is CARi,-1,+1, the three-day cumulative abnormal return around the 
share repurchase announcement. Equation 1 reports the probit estimation outputs for the first stage of 
+HFNPDQ¶V  WZR VWDJH DSSURDFK ZKHUH ZH HVWLPDWH D SURELW PRGHO ZLWK WKH GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH 
(buyback) is equal to one if a firm makes an announcement of its intention to repurchase shares and zero 
otherwise, across all listed firms in the three countries, during the time span of our study. From the first 
stage we estimate the inverse Mill¶s ratio which is then included as an additional control variable in the 
second stage regressions. The second stage regressions are reported in Equations (2)-(7), where the 
dependent variable is the event window market announcement CARi,
-1,+1.  The remaining variables are 
defined as in Table 4. All regressions include industry dummies. The p-values are based on cluster-adjusted 
robust standard errors at the firm level (Petersen, 2009) and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate p 
<0.01, <0.05, and  <0.1, respectively. 
 
Buyback CARi,-1 to +1 
 
Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 6 Eq. 7 
Inverse Mill¶s ratio 
 
-0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.001 
 
 
(0.452) (0.165) (0.518) (0.154) (0.442) (0.843) 
Constant -19.336*** 0.006 0.007 -0.128*** 0.026 -0.084* 0.027 
 
(0.000) (0.359) (0.292) (0.007) (0.720) (0.063) (0.706) 
Rule of Law 18.832*** 
  
0.070 0.029 0.046 -0.106 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.265) (0.667) (0.452) (0.313) 
Regulatory Quality  -4.295*** 
  
0.055** 0.031 0.035 -0.129 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.030) (0.264) (0.191) (0.108) 
Initial  
   
0.008* 
  
0.007 
 
   
(0.080) 
  
(0.136) 
EU Directive 
    
-0.003 -0.006 0.002 
 
    
(0.559) (0.156) (0.801) 
Treasury 
   
-0.014** -0.011 -0.015** -0.030** 
 
   
(0.026) (0.117) (0.015) (0.035) 
Leverage 0.000*** 
  
0.019 0.024 
 
0.017 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.216) (0.145) 
 
(0.314) 
MB 0.033*** 
   
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
(0.004) 
   
(0.629) 
 
(0.837) 
Pre 1-year returns 
   
-0.011** -0.012 
  
 
   
(0.021) (0.186) 
  Pre 20-days returns 
     
0.311*** 
 
 
     
(0.000) 
 Size 0.984*** 
   
-0.010*** 
  
 
(0.000) 
   
(0.016) 
  Ownership  -0.001 
   
0.000 
 
0.000* 
Concentration (0.505) 
   
(0.339) 
 
(0.050) 
Cash -0.006*** 
   
-0.050** -0.050** -0.045** 
 
(0.000) 
   
(0.035) (0.027) (0.038) 
Tax Differential 
   0.013 0.004 0.026 0.140** 
 
   (0.665) (0.910) (0.413) (0.029) 
Dividend  -0.078*** 
  
0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.268) (0.071) (0.241) (0.193) 
AIM 
  
0.018 0.016 0.003 0.021 0.009 
 
  
(0.243) (0.317) (0.837) (0.243) (0.557) 
Neuer Markt 
  
0.023 0.020 0.015 0.026* 0.026 
 
  
(0.176) (0.224) (0.353) (0.076) (0.101) 
Industry dummies 9  9  9  9  9  9  9  
Year dummies 9  
      Obs. 17,755 761 761 761 761 761 761 
Adj. R2(%) 57.89 04.88 05.61 09.64 12.00 17.48 12.11 
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Figure 1. Annual Distribution of Announcements of Share Repurchases.  
This figure shows the annual number of open market share repurchase announcements for 
each country. The sample includes 970 open market share repurchases announcements over 
the period 1997 to 2006, split into 513 in the UK, 263 in France, and the remaining 194 in 
Germany.   
 
 
 
Figure 2. CARs for Entire Sample. 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns for the forty-day period surrounding 
the announcement date [-20 to +20] for the entire sample. In Figure 2B we distinguish 
between initial and subsequent announcements. The sample consists of 970 announcements of 
intention to repurchase shares on the open market of which 513 took place in the UK, 263 in 
France, and the remaining 194 in Germany over the period 1997 to 2006. 
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Figure 3A. CARs per country. 
Figure 3A shows the cumulative average abnormal returns for the forty-day period 
surrounding the announcement date [-20 to +20] for each country. In Figure 3B we 
distinguish between initial and subsequent announcements. The sample consists of 970 
announcements of intention to repurchase shares on the open market of which 513 took place 
in the UK, 263 in France, and the remaining 194 in Germany over the period 1997 to 2006. 
 
 
 
Figure 3B. CARs for Initial and Subsequent Announcements.  
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Appendix 1. Summary statistics for cross-sectional regression variables 
This table reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum respectively for each of the three samples of the market reaction to the 
announcement of an open market share repurchase program and the respective explanatory variables employed on the cross-sectional regressions for each of the three 
countries under analysis (UK, France and Germany) over the period 1997 to 2006. CAR(-1+1) is the three-day cumulative abnormal return around the share repurchase 
announcement. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the repurchasing firm in the end of the calendar year prior to the repurchase announcement. MB is the 
market to book value of equity, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Cash LVWKHILUP¶VUDWLRRIQHWLQFRPHEHIRUHWD[HVSOXVGHSUHFLDWLRQDQGFKDQJHVLQGHIHUUHGWD[HV
and other deferred charges to total assets at the end of the year prior to the share repurchase announcement. Size is the book value of total assets scaled by 100,000. Pre 1-
year return is the daily cumulative market adjusted return for the period of 255 days prior and 2 days prior to the announcement of a share repurchase. Pre 20-days return is 
the daily cumulative market adjusted return for the period of 22 days prior and 2 days prior to the repurchase announcement. Ownership concentration is the percentage of 
closely held shares divided by the number of common shares outstanding. Closely held shares include shares held by management, corporations, benefit/pension schemes and 
individuals that hold 5% or more of the common shares outstanding. Dividend is the ratio of total cash dividends scaled by net income in the year prior to the repurchase 
announcement. Initial is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is the initial announcement made by the firm and zero otherwise. Treasury shares is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one when an announcement of intention to repurchase took place after Dec. 1st, 2003 when repurchased shares were allowed to be keep as 
treasury shares in the UK.. EU Directive is a dummy variable that takes the value of one following the date of implementation in each of the three countries. AIM (Neuer 
Markt) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms listed on the London Alternative Investment Market (German Neuer Markt) and zero otherwise. Tax 
differential is the ratio of effective tax paid on dividends relative to capital gains tax as in Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012). Regulatory quality and Rule of law are indices 
measuring the quality of support to shareholders obtained from the International Country Risk Guide. 
 
    
CAR 
(-1,+1) 
Leverage MB Cash Size Pre-announcement 
returns 
Ownership 
concent. Dividend 
Initial 
announc. 
Treasury 
shares 
EU 
Directive AIM 
Neuer 
Markt 
Tax 
differential 
Regulat
ory 
quality 
Rule of 
law 
    
     
1-year 20-days 
        
  
A
ll 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
Obs. 970 933 928 900 933 970 970 861 884 970 970 970 970 970 970 970 970 
Mean 0.017 0.214 2.941 0.116 383 -0.032 -0.002 26.243 2.453 0.636 0.241 0.246 0.027 0.067 1.076 0.944 0.889 
St. Dev. 0.059 0.176 3.806 0.134 1,490 0.413 0.055 24.220 2.330 0.481 0.428 0.431 0.162 0.250 0.195 0.094 0.087 
Min -0.329 0.000 0.090 -1.649 0 -2.330 -0.343 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 0 0 0.800 0.636 0.750 
Max 0.386 0.928 26.274 0.640 15,000 1.864 0.099 88.182 29.583 1 1 1 1 1 1.458 1.000 1.000 
 
                 
U
K
 
Obs. 513 482 486 476 482 513 513 498 454 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 514 
Mean 0.019 0.230 3.144 0.114 323 -0.006 0.002 15.295 3.043 0.589 0.456 0.228 0.051 0 1.253 0.975 0.962 
St. Dev. 0.056 0.185 4.474 0.129 1,300 0.329 0.050 17.605 2.684 0.493 0.499 0.420 0.220 0 0.060 0.041 0.042 
Min -0.275 0.000 0.090 -1.148 0 -1.676 -0.257 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 0 0 1.153 0.864 0.917 
Max 0.386 0.928 26.274 0.640 14,000 1.022 0.098 71.809 29.583 1 1 1 1 0 1.458 1.000 1.000 
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Fr
an
ce
 
Obs. 263 258 257 240 258 263 263 229 254 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 
Mean 0.008 0.236 2.539 0.118 416 -0.028 -0.005 42.436 1.887 0.700 0 0.217 0 0 0.879 0.890 0.809 
St. Dev. 0.049 0.161 2.678 0.105 1,600 0.385 0.048 24.649 1.617 0.459 0 0.413 0 0 0.050 0.131 0.038 
Min -0.180 0.000 0.450 -0.516 0 -1.631 -0.206 0.061 0.000 0 0 0 0 0 0.800 0.636 0.750 
Max 0.193 0.800 26.274 0.485 15,000 1.350 0.098 88.182 11.657 1 0 1 0 0 0.964 1.000 0.917 
 
  
                 
G
er
m
an
y 
Obs. 194 193 184 184 193 194 194 134 176 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 
Mean 0.023 0.147 2.968 0.120 491 -0.107 -0.011 39.255 1.748 0.675 0 0.335 0 0.335 0.875 0.933 0.805 
St. Dev. 0.074 0.154 3.148 0.175 1,770 0.599 0.072 22.858 1.760 0.469 0 0.473 0 0.473 0.048 0.103 0.036 
Min -0.329 0.000 0.200 -1.649 0 -2.330 -0.343 0.004 0.000 0 0 0 0 0 0.800 0.727 0.750 
Max 0.345 0.758 20.230 0.505 12,000 1.864 0.099 86.073 6.897 1 0 1 0 1 0.964 1.000 0.833 
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